The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control
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Publication:627120
DOI10.1016/J.IC.2010.09.001zbMATH Open1218.91042OpenAlexW1983312130MaRDI QIDQ627120FDOQ627120
Authors: Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra, Jörg Rothe, Lane A. Hemaspaandra 
Publication date: 21 February 2011
Published in: Information and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ic.2010.09.001
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algorithmscomplexity theorymultiagent systemspreference aggregationcomputational social choicecontrol and manipulation of elections
Cites Work
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- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Testing for the consecutive ones property, interval graphs, and graph planarity using PQ-tree algorithms
- Incidence matrices and interval graphs
- Computational Aspects of Approval Voting
- A Richer Understanding of the Complexity of Election Systems
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- How hard is it to control an election?
- The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
- Bypassing combinatorial protections: polynomial-time algorithms for single-peaked electorates
- Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
- How hard is bribery in elections?
- The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control
- Dichotomy for voting systems
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- A heuristic technique for multi-agent planning
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- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
- Voting cycles and the structure of individual preferences
- A characterization of the single-peaked domain
- Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model
- Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries
- A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Unidimensional Unfolding Representations
- Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences
- Recognizing single-peaked preferences on a tree
Cited In (30)
- Parameterized complexity of voter control in multi-peaked elections
- The control complexity of \(r\)-Approval: from the single-peaked case to the general case
- On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences
- On the complexity of bribery with distance restrictions
- Are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby?
- Control complexity in Borda elections: solving all open cases of offline control and some cases of online control
- Complexity of manipulation and bribery in premise-based judgment aggregation with simple formulas
- Resilient heuristic aggregation of judgments in the pairwise comparisons method
- Exact algorithms for weighted and unweighted Borda manipulation problems
- Recovering single-crossing preferences from approval ballots
- Optimal defense against election control by deleting voter groups
- The complexity of priced control in elections
- Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions
- The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates
- Campaign management under approval-driven voting rules
- The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control
- A parameterized perspective on protecting elections
- Structure of single-peaked preferences
- Is computational complexity a barrier to manipulation?
- Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
- Towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules
- Single-peaked consistency for weak orders is easy
- Group control for consent rules with consecutive qualifications
- Bypassing combinatorial protections: polynomial-time algorithms for single-peaked electorates
- Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: a theoretical analysis
- Combinatorial voter control in elections
- Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey
- Normalized range voting broadly resists control
- Structured preferences: a literature survey
- A characterization of the single-peaked single-crossing domain
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