The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control
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Publication:627120
DOI10.1016/j.ic.2010.09.001zbMath1218.91042OpenAlexW1983312130MaRDI QIDQ627120
Jörg Rothe, Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, Lane A.
Publication date: 21 February 2011
Published in: Information and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ic.2010.09.001
algorithmsmultiagent systemscomplexity theorycomputational social choicepreference aggregationcontrol and manipulation of elections
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