Combinatorial voter control in elections
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Publication:2346381
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Cites work
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- A simplified NP-complete satisfiability problem
- An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
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- How hard is it to control an election?
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6747953 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2234775 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2243357 (Why is no real title available?)
- Integer Programming with a Fixed Number of Variables
- Large-scale election campaigns: combinatorial shift bribery
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- Parameterized computational complexity of control problems in voting systems
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- Single-crossing, strategic voting and the median choice rule
- Some simplified NP-complete graph problems
- Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model
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- The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control
Cited in
(18)- Optimal defense against election control by deleting voter groups
- Structured proportional representation
- A parameterized perspective on protecting elections
- Exploiting social influence to control elections based on positional scoring rules
- Resolute control: forbidding candidates from winning an election is hard
- Parameterized complexity of voter control in multi-peaked elections
- Vote splitting, reelection and electoral control: towards a unified model
- Are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby?
- Combinatorial voter control in elections
- On the computational complexity of variants of combinatorial voter control in elections
- The complexity of priced control in elections
- Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control
- Prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery
- New candidates welcome! Possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates
- Multi-winner Election Control via Social Influence
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6747925 (Why is no real title available?)
- Cluster editing for multi-layer and temporal graphs
- On the complexity of winner determination and strategic control in conditional approval voting
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