Combinatorial voter control in elections
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Publication:2346381
DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2015.04.023zbMath1318.91057OpenAlexW1992230522WikidataQ62039072 ScholiaQ62039072MaRDI QIDQ2346381
Jiehua Chen, Piotr Faliszewski, Laurent Bulteau, Nimrod Talmon, Rolf Niedermeier
Publication date: 1 June 2015
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2015.04.023
votingplurality ruleparameterized complexitydomain restrictionsCondorcet's ruleNP-hard election control problem
Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Voting theory (91B12) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17)
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Uses Software
Cites Work
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