Exploiting social influence to control elections based on positional scoring rules

DOI10.1016/J.IC.2022.104940OpenAlexW4285097360MaRDI QIDQ2105422FDOQ2105422

Authors: Federico Corò, Emilio Cruciani, Gianlorenzo D'Angelo, Stefano Ponziani 

Publication date: 8 December 2022

Published in: Information and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ic.2022.104940

zbMATH Keywords

social networksapproximation algorithmsinfluence maximizationcomputational social choiceelection control

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of computing (68Qxx)

Cites Work

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• Handbook of Computational Social Choice
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• Optimal defense against election control by deleting voter groups
• On the Computational Complexity of Variants of Combinatorial Voter Control in Elections

Cited In (2)

• Heuristics for opinion diffusion via local elections
• Multi-winner Election Control via Social Influence

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