Exploiting social influence to control elections based on positional scoring rules
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Publication:2105422
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6474901 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3523369 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7657254 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice
- An analysis of approximations for maximizing submodular set functions—I
- Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
- Combinatorial voter control in elections
- Control and bribery in voting
- Handbook of Computational Social Choice
- How hard is it to control an election?
- Large-scale election campaigns: combinatorial shift bribery
- Minority becomes majority in social networks
- On the computational complexity of variants of combinatorial voter control in elections
- Optimal defense against election control by deleting voter groups
- Swap bribery
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