Multi-winner Election Control via Social Influence

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-54921-3_19MaRDI QIDQ5100968zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mohammad Abouei Mehrizi, Gianlorenzo D'Angelo

Publication date 1 September 2022

Published in Structural Information and Communication Complexity (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.04037

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Computer system organization (68Mxx) Communication complexity, information complexity (68Q11) Graph theory (including graph drawing) in computer science (68R10)

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Cites work

• Control and bribery in voting
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6474901 (Why is no real title available?)
• Introduction to the theory of voting
• Minority becomes majority in social networks

Cited in

(4)

• Control of social choice systems
• Election control through social influence with unknown preferences
• Exploiting social influence to control elections based on positional scoring rules
• Election control through social influence with voters' uncertainty

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