Preference elicitation and robust winner determination for single- and multi-winner social choice
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Publication:2287202
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- Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries
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Cited in
(12)- Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries
- Robust winner determination in positional scoring rules with uncertain weights
- Manipulative elicitation -- a new attack on elections with incomplete preferences
- Vote elicitation with probabilistic preference models: empirical estimation and cost tradeoffs
- Eliciting a suitable voting rule via examples
- Solving multi-agent knapsack problems using incremental approval voting
- Multi-winner Election Control via Social Influence
- Incomplete information and communication in voting
- Simultaneous elicitation of scoring rule and agent preferences for robust winner determination
- Reaching a joint decision with minimal elicitation of voter preferences
- Subset selection via implicit utilitarian voting
- Preference elicitation for group decisions
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