Preference elicitation and robust winner determination for single- and multi-winner social choice
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Publication:2287202
DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2019.103203zbMATH Open1482.91084OpenAlexW2987977793WikidataQ126812904 ScholiaQ126812904MaRDI QIDQ2287202FDOQ2287202
Authors: Tyler Lu, Craig Boutilier 
Publication date: 20 January 2020
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2019.103203
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decision theoryrobust optimizationvotingsocial choicepreference elicitationminimax regretpartial preferences
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Cited In (12)
- Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries
- Robust winner determination in positional scoring rules with uncertain weights
- Vote elicitation with probabilistic preference models: empirical estimation and cost tradeoffs
- Manipulative elicitation -- a new attack on elections with incomplete preferences
- Eliciting a suitable voting rule via examples
- Solving multi-agent knapsack problems using incremental approval voting
- Multi-winner Election Control via Social Influence
- Incomplete information and communication in voting
- Simultaneous elicitation of scoring rule and agent preferences for robust winner determination
- Reaching a joint decision with minimal elicitation of voter preferences
- Subset selection via implicit utilitarian voting
- Preference elicitation for group decisions
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