Properties of multiwinner voting rules
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Publication:2628711
DOI10.1007/s00355-017-1026-zzbMath1392.91032DBLPjournals/scw/ElkindFSS17arXiv1506.02891OpenAlexW3137712949WikidataQ59609209 ScholiaQ59609209MaRDI QIDQ2628711
Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Elkind, Piotr Skowron, Arkadii M. Slinko
Publication date: 2 June 2017
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1506.02891
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