How to choose a non-controversial list with k names
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Publication:930481
DOI10.1007/S00355-007-0268-6zbMATH Open1142.91433OpenAlexW2127882486MaRDI QIDQ930481FDOQ930481
Authors: Danilo Coelho, Salvador Barberà 
Publication date: 30 June 2008
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0268-6
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Cites Work
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- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- A dictionary for voting paradoxes
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Voting by Committees
- The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
- Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- Self-selection consistent functions
- A note on the extension of an order on a set to the power set
- On the rule of \(k\) names
- Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees
- Discrete Mathematics in Voting and Group Choice
Cited In (16)
- Electing a committee with dominance constraints
- On stable rules for selecting committees
- Properties of multiwinner voting rules
- Robustness among multiwinner voting rules
- Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives
- On the rule of \(k\) names
- Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences
- Utilitarian welfare and representation guarantees of approval-based multiwinner rules
- Gehrlein stable committee with multi-modal preferences
- The expanding approvals rule: improving proportional representation and monotonicity
- Social acceptability of Condorcet committees
- Manipulability of consular election rules
- When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?
- Coincidence of Condorcet committees
- Approval-based apportionment
- Balancing the power to appoint officers
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