How to choose a non-controversial list with k names
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Recommendations
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 736965
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Cites work
- A dictionary for voting paradoxes
- A note on the extension of an order on a set to the power set
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- Discrete Mathematics in Voting and Group Choice
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- On the rule of \(k\) names
- Self-selection consistent functions
- Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners
- Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
- Voting by Committees
Cited in
(20)- Coincidence of Condorcet committees
- Utilitarian welfare and representation guarantees of approval-based multiwinner rules
- When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?
- Electing a committee with dominance constraints
- The expanding approvals rule: improving proportional representation and monotonicity
- On stable rules for selecting committees
- Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives
- Manipulability of consular election rules
- Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences
- Properties of multiwinner voting rules
- On the advantages and disadvantages of being the first mover under rules of \(k\) names
- Balancing the power to appoint officers
- Robustness among multiwinner voting rules
- Gehrlein stable committee with multi-modal preferences
- Approval-based apportionment
- Weighted scoring rules for selecting a compatible committee
- Compiling the votes of a subelectorate for multi-winner voting rules
- Proportional justified representation
- Social acceptability of Condorcet committees
- On the rule of \(k\) names
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