Discrete Mathematics in Voting and Group Choice
DOI10.1137/0605028zbMATH Open0536.90004OpenAlexW2071989092MaRDI QIDQ3321780FDOQ3321780
Authors: Peter Fishburn 
Publication date: 1984
Published in: SIAM Journal on Algebraic Discrete Methods (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/0605028
Recommendations
- Decision theory and discrete mathematics
- Mathematics and voting
- Mathematics and democracy. Recent advances in voting systems and collective choice. Including papers from the International Workshop on Mathematics and Democracy: Voting Systems and Collective Choice, held in Erice, September 18--23, 2005.
- The mathematics of voting
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5240213
votinginteger optimizationgroup choicerepresentative systemscyclic majoritiescombinatorial impossibility theoremsdiscrete ranking structureslinear separation lemmasnested hierarchies of sign functions
Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14) Discrete mathematics in relation to computer science (68R99)
Cites Work
- Social choice and individual values
- Condorcet's paradox
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
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- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- Monotonicity paradoxes in the theory of elections
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- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The Voting Problem
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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- Title not available (Why is that?)
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- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
- The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution
- Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof
- Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
- Formal Structure of Majority Decision
- The Theory of Representative Majority Decision
- On the sum-of-ranks winner when losers are removed
- Proportional representation in variable-size legislatures
- Voting Anomalies, the Number of Voters, and the Number of Alternatives
- Condorcet proportions and Kelly's conjectures
- Proportions of profiles with a majority candidate
- Inverted orders for monotone scoring rules
- Optimal pairs of score vectors for positional scoring rules
- Heights of representative systems
- Three-valued representative systems
- Social Choice Functions
Cited In (8)
- Social Choice Theory
- Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model
- How to choose a non-controversial list with \(k\) names
- Higher dimensional restricted lattice paths with diagonal steps
- From enumerating to generating: a linear time algorithm for generating 2D lattice paths with a given number of turns
- Robustness against inefficient manipulation
- Counting Quota Systems: A Combinatorial Question from Social Choice Theory
- An information and preference theory approach to a discrete resource allocation problem
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