scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657
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Publication:5635232
zbMATH Open0227.90011MaRDI QIDQ5635232FDOQ5635232
Authors: Amartya Sen
Publication date: 1970
Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)
Social choice (91B14) Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-01) Public goods (91B18)
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- Consensus functions on trees that satisfy an independence axiom
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- Utility representation via additive or multiplicative error functions.
- The liberal paradox, decisiveness over issues, and domain restrictions
- Rawlsian distributive justice and rights
- The informational basis of scoring rules
- Measurement theory and the foundations of utilitarianism
- On social welfare functionals: representation theorems and equivalence classes
- Generalized social welfare functionals: Welfarism, morality and liberty
- A generalization of Moulin's Pareto extension theorem
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