scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657
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zbMath0227.90011MaRDI QIDQ5635232
Publication date: 1970
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Public goods (91B18) Social choice (91B14) Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-01)
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