scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657

zbMATH Open0227.90011MaRDI QIDQ5635232FDOQ5635232

Publication date: 1970

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Social choice (91B14) Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-01) Public goods (91B18)

Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)

The outflow ranking method for weighted directed graphs
New problems in the general choice theory
A Pareto optimal characterization of Rawls' social choice mechanism
Multidimensional welfare comparisons of EU member states before, during, and after the financial crisis: a dominance approach
A non-dictatorial compromise
Media theory
Ranking by outdegree for directed graphs
Peter J. Hammond
On collective utility functions admitting linear representations
Computing leximin-optimal solutions in constraint networks
Demystifying the `metric approach to social compromise with the unanimity criterion'
Voting procedures, complexity of
Using fuzzy binary relations for identifying noninferior decision alternatives
Rawls versus Bentham: An axiomatic examination of the pure distribution problem
On the application of multiattribute utility theory to models of choice
On the topological equivalence of the Arrow impossibility theorem and Amartya Sen's liberal paradox
Decision-support with preference constraints
Empathy and respect for the rights of others
On liberal values
Weak pseudo-rationalizability
The Moebius strip and a social choice paradox
Hierarchical voting
A correct proof of the McMorris-Powers' theorem on the consensus of phylogenies
Generalized Sen-Coherence and existence of preferred with probability at least half winners
Equivalence of the HEX game theorem and the Arrow impossibility theorem
Discrete Mathematics in Voting and Group Choice
A note on extreme inequality aversion
Rational aggregation rules
Consensus functions on trees that satisfy an independence axiom
Information, associativity, and choice requirements
Utility representation via additive or multiplicative error functions.
The liberal paradox, decisiveness over issues, and domain restrictions
Rawlsian distributive justice and rights
The informational basis of scoring rules
Measurement theory and the foundations of utilitarianism
On social welfare functionals: representation theorems and equivalence classes
Generalized social welfare functionals: Welfarism, morality and liberty
A generalization of Moulin's Pareto extension theorem
Paretian efficiency, Rawlsian justice and the Nozick theory of rights
On the derivation of majority rule
Binary games in constitutional form and collective choice
An example in group preference
Induced social welfare functions
Some algebraic characterizations of preference structures
Equivalence and compositions of fuzzy rationality measures
On fair allocations and monetary compensations
Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions
A topological approach to the Arrow impossibility theorem when individual preferences are weak orders
No individual priorities and the Nash bargaining solution
Restricted Pareto and rights
New axiomatic characterizations of utilitarianism
A power rule for social choice
Independence of the status quo? A weak and a strong impossibility result for social decisions by bargaining
A folk meta-theorem in the foundations of utility theory
Aggregation of preferences: The fuzzy case
From Preference Relations to Fuzzy Choice Functions
On transitivity of the social preference relation under simple majority rule
Liberalism, efficiency, and stability: Some possibility results
Knowledge-level analysis of belief base operations
Interactive multiple objective optimization: Survey. I: Continuous case
Modeling rationality in a linguistic framework
Restricted domains, Arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives
Egalitarianism, utilitarianism, and the Nash bargaining solution
Collective rationality versus distribution of power for binary social choice functions
Essential alternatives and freedom rankings
Quasi-transitive and Suzumura consistent relations
On evaluating social welfare by sequential generalized Lorenz dominance
On Pareto-efficiency and the no-envy concept of equity
The structure of coalitional power under probabilistic group decision rules
Voting over flat taxes in an endowment economy
On Karamardian's theorem about lower semicontinuous strictly quasiconvex functions
Social choice and cooperative game theory: voting games as social aggregation functions
Voting operators in the space of choice functions
SSB utility theory: An economic perspective
Convex geometry and group choice
Some implications of an intensity measure of envy
Collective judgement: combining individual value judgements
Functional voting operators: The non-monotonic case
Measurement scales and welfarist social choice
Towards Copeland optimization in combinatorial problems
Faithful consensus methods for n-trees
On the concept of fairness
Factor and ideal point analysis for interpersonally incomparable data
Level \(r\) consensus and stable social choice
The ordinal Nash social welfare function
Threshold preferences and the environment
Structural instability of decision majority rules
Probabilistic models of choice
Weak path independence
A note on manipulability of large voting schemes
Restricted domains, Arrow social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private and public alternatives
Sensitivity analysis for choice problems with partial preference relations
On the existence of maximal elements: An impossibility theorem
Consensus functions defined on trees
Social evaluation functionals with an arbitrary set of alternatives
Numerical representability of ordered topological spaces with compatible algebraic structure
Nondictatorial social welfare functions with different discrimination structures
Choice functions and hard choices
On the structure of fuzzy social welfare functions
Existence of stable situations, restricted preferences, and strategic manipulation under democratic group decision rules

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