On the equivalence of the Arrow impossibility theorem and the Brouwer fixed point theorem when individual preferences are weak orders
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Publication:845603
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.09.004zbMath1179.91019MaRDI QIDQ845603
Publication date: 29 January 2010
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.09.004
91A05: 2-person games
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