On the equivalence of the Arrow impossibility theorem and the Brouwer fixed point theorem
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Publication:2489420
DOI10.1016/j.amc.2005.02.054zbMath1130.91021MaRDI QIDQ2489420
Publication date: 28 April 2006
Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2005.02.054
91B14: Social choice
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