The topological equivalence of the Pareto condition and the existence of a dictator
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Publication:1159073
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(82)90028-3zbMath0474.90010OpenAlexW3125906314MaRDI QIDQ1159073
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(82)90028-3
social choicetopological equivalenceexistence of a dictatorPareto conditioncontinuous rulesindividual preference aggregation rules
Related Items (17)
The Moebius strip and a social choice paradox ⋮ On the equivalence of the Arrow impossibility theorem and the Brouwer fixed point theorem when individual preferences are weak orders ⋮ Intersecting families of sets and the topology of cones in economics ⋮ On the topological equivalence of the Arrow impossibility theorem and Amartya Sen's liberal paradox ⋮ A topological approach to Wilson's impossibility theorem ⋮ Plural identities and preference formation ⋮ Aggregation of utility and social choice: a topological characterization. ⋮ From decision problems to dethroned dictators ⋮ On isotopic dictators and homological manipulators ⋮ A topological approach to the Arrow impossibility theorem when individual preferences are weak orders ⋮ On the equivalence of the Arrow impossibility theorem and the Brouwer fixed point theorem ⋮ Demystifying the `metric approach to social compromise with the unanimity criterion' ⋮ A topological proof of Eliaz's unified theorem of social choice theory ⋮ Continuous-valued social choice ⋮ Topological social choice ⋮ Harmless Homotopic Dictators ⋮ Necessary and sufficient conditions for a resolution of the social choice paradox
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