Social choice and the topology of spaces of preferences

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Publication:1146096

DOI10.1016/0001-8708(80)90032-8zbMath0446.90004OpenAlexW3023888380WikidataQ56564655 ScholiaQ56564655MaRDI QIDQ1146096

Graciela Chichilnisky

Publication date: 1980

Published in: Advances in Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8006/1/MPRA_paper_8006.pdf




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