Anonymous and neutral majority rules
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Publication:404770
DOI10.1007/s00355-013-0787-2zbMath1297.91060OpenAlexW2165965633MaRDI QIDQ404770
Michele Gori, Daniela Bubboloni
Publication date: 4 September 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0787-2
Related Items (9)
On the reversal bias of the minimax social choice correspondence ⋮ Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules ⋮ Symmetric majority rules ⋮ Resolute refinements of social choice correspondences ⋮ Flexible majority rules in democracyville: a guided tour ⋮ Breaking ties in collective decision-making ⋮ Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited ⋮ Anonymous and neutral social choice: a unified framework for existence results, maximal domains and tie-breaking ⋮ Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences
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