Recommendations
- Symmetric majority rules
- Anonymous and positively responsive aggregation rules
- Pareto, anonymity or neutrality, but not IIA: countably many alternatives
- Anonymous and neutral social choice: a unified framework for existence results, maximal domains and tie-breaking
- Another characterization of the majority rule.
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3126031 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3864918 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3577438 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3223737 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- A new characterization of the majority rule
- Aggregation rules that satisfy anonymity and neutrality
- Anonymity, monotonicity, and limited neutrality: selecting a single alternative from a binary agenda
- Another characterization of the majority rule.
- Characterizations of majoritarianism: a unified approach
- Characterizing majority rule: from profiles to societies
- Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
- Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda
- Maskin monotonic aggregation rules
- Social choice and the topology of spaces of preferences
- Symmetry groups
- Uniform generation of anonymous and neutral preference profiles for social choice rules
- Update monotone preference rules
- Voting, the symmetric group, and representation theory
Cited in
(18)- Breaking ties in collective decision-making
- Pareto, anonymity or neutrality, but not IIA: countably many alternatives
- On the reversal bias of the minimax social choice correspondence
- Anonymous and neutral social choice: a unified framework for existence results, maximal domains and tie-breaking
- Anonymous and positively responsive aggregation rules
- Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda
- Anonymity in large societies
- Aggregation rules that satisfy anonymity and neutrality
- Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity
- Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences
- Symmetric majority rules
- Resolute refinements of social choice correspondences
- Flexible majority rules in democracyville: a guided tour
- Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules
- Anonymity, monotonicity, and limited neutrality: selecting a single alternative from a binary agenda
- Manipulability, unanimity, anonymity and merging functions
- Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited
- Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval
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