Anonymous and neutral majority rules
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Publication:404770
DOI10.1007/S00355-013-0787-2zbMATH Open1297.91060OpenAlexW2165965633MaRDI QIDQ404770FDOQ404770
Authors: Daniela Bubboloni, Michele Gori 
Publication date: 4 September 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0787-2
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Cites Work
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- Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
- Update monotone preference rules
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- Another characterization of the majority rule.
- A new characterization of the majority rule
- Characterizing majority rule: from profiles to societies
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- Social choice and the topology of spaces of preferences
- Aggregation rules that satisfy anonymity and neutrality
- Anonymity, monotonicity, and limited neutrality: selecting a single alternative from a binary agenda
- Voting, the symmetric group, and representation theory
- Uniform generation of anonymous and neutral preference profiles for social choice rules
- Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda
Cited In (18)
- Pareto, anonymity or neutrality, but not IIA: countably many alternatives
- Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda
- Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity
- On the reversal bias of the minimax social choice correspondence
- Symmetric majority rules
- Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited
- Aggregation rules that satisfy anonymity and neutrality
- Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval
- Breaking ties in collective decision-making
- Anonymity, monotonicity, and limited neutrality: selecting a single alternative from a binary agenda
- Anonymity in large societies
- Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences
- Manipulability, unanimity, anonymity and merging functions
- Anonymous and positively responsive aggregation rules
- Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules
- Resolute refinements of social choice correspondences
- Flexible majority rules in democracyville: a guided tour
- Anonymous and neutral social choice: a unified framework for existence results, maximal domains and tie-breaking
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