Maskin monotonic aggregation rules
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Publication:1929089
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2005.11.013zbMath1254.91133OpenAlexW2114588625MaRDI QIDQ1929089
Publication date: 7 January 2013
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2005.11.013
Related Items (18)
Maskin monotonic aggregation rules and partial anonymity ⋮ A characterization for qualified majority voting rules ⋮ Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences ⋮ On the structure of voting systems between two alternatives ⋮ Absolute qualified majoritarianism: how does the threshold matter? ⋮ Nash implementation of the majority rule ⋮ Aggregation rules that satisfy anonymity and neutrality ⋮ Anonymous and neutral majority rules ⋮ Anonymous and positively responsive aggregation rules ⋮ On the manipulability of equitable voting rules ⋮ The informational basis of scoring rules ⋮ On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules ⋮ Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations ⋮ Strategy-proofness and weighted voting ⋮ Anonymity, monotonicity, and quota pair systems ⋮ Stereotype formation as trait aggregation ⋮ Characterizations of majoritarianism: a unified approach ⋮ Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions
Cites Work
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- A simple characterization of majority rule
- Another characterization of the majority rule.
- A new characterization of the majority rule
- A complete characterization of majority rules
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
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