Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions

DOI10.1007/S11238-011-9261-8zbMATH Open1274.91174OpenAlexW1989443453MaRDI QIDQ763345FDOQ763345

Susumu Cato

Publication date: 9 March 2012

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-011-9261-8

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zbMATH Keywords

positive responsivenessanonymityneutralityweak Pareto principlemethod of majority decisionstrong Pareto principle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Social choice and individual values
• A simple characterization of majority rule
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• Impossibility theorems without collective rationality
• General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
• Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems
• Collective Choice Rules without the Pareto Principle
• Order restricted preferences and majority rule
• Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations
• A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule
• Maskin monotonic aggregation rules
• Another characterization of the majority rule.
• A new characterization of the majority rule
• Characterizing majority rule: from profiles to societies
• More on the majority rule: profiles, societies, and responsiveness
• Characterizations of majoritarianism: a unified approach
• A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions
• The Simple Majority Decision Rule
• May's theorem with an infinite population
• A characterization of consistent collective choice rules
• A complete characterization of majority rules
• Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
• A proof technique for social choice with variable electorate
• Acyclic and continuous social choice in \(T_ 1\) connected spaces. Including its application to economic environments
• Pareto principles from Inch to Ell
• The New Welfare Economics 1939-1974

Cited In (7)

• On anonymous and weighted voting systems
• Collective choice rules with social maximality
• Common preference, non-consequential features, and collective decision making
• Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings
• Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness
• POSITIVELY RESPONSIVE COLLECTIVE CHOICE RULES AND MAJORITY RULE: A GENERALIZATION OF MAY'S THEOREM TO MANY ALTERNATIVES
• Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited

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