Common preference, non-consequential features, and collective decision making

DOI10.1007/S10058-014-0164-3MaRDI QIDQ2254243zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Susumu Cato

Publication date 4 February 2015

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-014-0164-3

zbMATH Keywords

Arrow's impossibility theoremcollective decision makingwelfarismnon-consequentialism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Welfare economics (91B15)

Recommendations

• Collective decision-making by rational agents with differing preferences
• Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
• Collective Choice for Simple Preferences
• Classifications and inferences of collective preferences
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5159049
• Aggregation of utility-based individual preferences for group decision-making
• Collective Decision Making
• Collective decision making by rational individuals
• Preferences and consistency issues in group decision making

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
• Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: how much should we know about indifference surfaces?
• Characterizations of consequentialism and nonconsequentialism
• Consequences, opportunities, and Arrovian impossibility theorems with consequentialist domains
• Consequences, opportunities, and procedures
• Dichotomous preferences and the possibility of Arrovian social choice
• Dictators on blocks: Generalizations of social choice impossibility theorems
• Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle
• Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited
• Multi-profile welfarism: a generalization
• On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis
• Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions
• Social choice and individual values
• Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis
• The Existence of Social Welfare Functions
• The independence condition in the theory of social choice
• The informational basis of the theory of fair allocation
• Welfarist-consequentialism, similarity of attitudes, and Arrow's general impossibility theorem

Cited in

(5)

• Collective Choice May Tell Nothing About Anyone’s Individual Preferences
• Plural identities and preference formation
• Conformity preferences and information gathering effort in collective decision making
• Collective Choice for Simple Preferences
• Characterizations of consequentialism and nonconsequentialism

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