Common preference, non-consequential features, and collective decision making

DOI10.1007/s10058-014-0164-3zbMath1329.91036OpenAlexW1997196852MaRDI QIDQ2254243

Susumu Cato

Publication date: 4 February 2015

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-014-0164-3

zbMATH Keywords

Arrow's impossibility theoremcollective decision makingwelfarismnon-consequentialism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

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