Common preference, non-consequential features, and collective decision making
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Publication:2254243
DOI10.1007/s10058-014-0164-3zbMath1329.91036OpenAlexW1997196852MaRDI QIDQ2254243
Publication date: 4 February 2015
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-014-0164-3
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