Collective Choice for Simple Preferences
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Publication:2829677
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_4zbMath1348.91091OpenAlexW47870698MaRDI QIDQ2829677
Publication date: 8 November 2016
Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_4
Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Voting theory (91B12) Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)
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