Collective Choice for Simple Preferences
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Publication:2829677
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_4zbMATH Open1348.91091OpenAlexW47870698MaRDI QIDQ2829677FDOQ2829677
Authors: Biung-Ghi Ju 
Publication date: 8 November 2016
Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_4
Recommendations
- Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
- Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences
- Common preference, non-consequential features, and collective decision making
- Collective Choice May Tell Nothing About Anyone’s Individual Preferences
- Collective choice procedures
- Individually rational collective choice
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5159049
- Collective decision-making by rational agents with differing preferences
- Collective decision making by rational individuals
- Collective choice with endogenous reference outcome
Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Voting theory (91B12)
Cites Work
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- A simple characterization of plurality rule
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- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
- On the axiomatic method and its recent applications to game theory and resource allocation
- Voting by Committees
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- Voting by committees under constraints
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- Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
- Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption
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Cited In (12)
- Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences
- Collective Choice May Tell Nothing About Anyone’s Individual Preferences
- Common preference, non-consequential features, and collective decision making
- Preferences for harmony and minority voting
- Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences
- Community standards
- Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Dis\&approval voting: a characterization
- Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
- Classifications and inferences of collective preferences
- Characterizations of approval ranking
- Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser
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