Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser

DOI10.1007/S11238-019-09716-5zbMATH Open1426.91097OpenAlexW2905271925WikidataQ127557205 ScholiaQ127557205MaRDI QIDQ2329162FDOQ2329162

Eric Kamwa

Publication date: 17 October 2019

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://hal.univ-antilles.fr/hal-01786121/file/PAV.pdf

Recommendations

• A note on approval voting and electing the Condorcet loser
• The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
• Approval voting, Borda winners, and Condorcet winners: evidence from seven elections
• When does approval voting make the ``right choices?
• On the Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and extended scoring rules for three alternatives

zbMATH Keywords

rankingprobabilityapproval votingCondorcetextended impartial culture

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• The variance of Spearman's rho in normal samples
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• The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
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• A note on approval voting and electing the Condorcet loser
• On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives
• Borda's paradox with weighted scoring rules
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• Title not available (Why is that?)
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Cited In (8)

• Approval voting, Borda winners, and Condorcet winners: evidence from seven elections
• Preference–Approval Structures in Group Decision Making: Axiomatic Distance and Aggregation
• Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention
• Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference
• Democratic elections and centralized decisions: Condorcet and approval voting compared with median and coverage locations
• A family of distances for preference-approvals
• On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
• On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences

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