Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser
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Recommendations
- A note on approval voting and electing the Condorcet loser
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- On the Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and extended scoring rules for three alternatives
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5240213 (Why is no real title available?)
- A REDUCTION FORMULA FOR NORMAL MULTIVARIATE INTEGRALS
- A note on approval voting and electing the Condorcet loser
- A representation for quadrivariate normal positive orthant probabilities
- Another perspective on Borda's paradox
- Approval voting
- Axiomatizations of approval voting
- Borda's paradox with weighted scoring rules
- Collective Choice for Simple Preferences
- Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference
- Elections, voting rules and paradoxical outcomes
- Handbook on approval voting
- How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?
- OH Radical-Initiated Reaction of 3-Hexene-2,5-dione: Formation of Methylglyoxal
- On probability models in voting theory
- On the Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and extended scoring rules for three alternatives
- On the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
- On the probability of observing Borda's paradox
- Probabilities of election outcomes for large electorates
- Robustness of positional scoring over subsets of alternatives
- The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
- The effectiveness of weighted scoring rules when pairwise majority rule cycles exist.
- The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes
- The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution
- The variance of Spearman's rho in normal samples
- Voting systems that combine approval and preference
Cited in
(10)- Approval voting, Borda winners, and Condorcet winners: evidence from seven elections
- Preference–Approval Structures in Group Decision Making: Axiomatic Distance and Aggregation
- Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention
- A note on approval voting and electing the Condorcet loser
- On the Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and extended scoring rules for three alternatives
- Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference
- Democratic elections and centralized decisions: Condorcet and approval voting compared with median and coverage locations
- A family of distances for preference-approvals
- On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
- On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences
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