Axiomatizations of Approval Voting
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2829678
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_5zbMath1348.91100OpenAlexW2582648MaRDI QIDQ2829678
Publication date: 8 November 2016
Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_5
Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items
Evaluationwise strategy-proofness, Dis\&approval voting: a characterization, Majority rule on \(j\)-rich ballot spaces, Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences, Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser, Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations, Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem
Cites Work
- Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting
- A simple characterization of approval voting
- Approval voting on dichotomous preferences
- Characterizing approval voting
- Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof
- Characterizations of scoring methods for preference aggregation
- Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
