Approval voting on dichotomous preferences
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Publication:866924
DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0149-4zbMath1134.91361MaRDI QIDQ866924
Publication date: 14 February 2007
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0149-4
Related Items
Social Choice Theory, Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures, Infinite-population approval voting: a proposal, A characterization result for approval voting with a variable set of alternatives, Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: an impossibility result, Size approval voting, Evaluationwise strategy-proofness, Majority rule on \(j\)-rich ballot spaces, Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations, Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences, Approval voting and fixed electorate with dichotomous preferences, Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem, Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of approval voting, A continuous rating method for preferential voting. The incomplete case, Axiomatizations of Approval Voting
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