Approval voting on dichotomous preferences
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Publication:866924
DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0149-4zbMath1134.91361OpenAlexW2101334388MaRDI QIDQ866924
Publication date: 14 February 2007
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0149-4
Related Items (15)
Evaluationwise strategy-proofness ⋮ Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures ⋮ Infinite-population approval voting: a proposal ⋮ Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of approval voting ⋮ A continuous rating method for preferential voting. The incomplete case ⋮ A characterization result for approval voting with a variable set of alternatives ⋮ Majority rule on \(j\)-rich ballot spaces ⋮ Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences ⋮ Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: an impossibility result ⋮ Size approval voting ⋮ Axiomatizations of Approval Voting ⋮ Approval voting and fixed electorate with dichotomous preferences ⋮ Social Choice Theory ⋮ Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations ⋮ Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem
Cites Work
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- Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting
- Essential aggregation procedures on restricted domains of preferences
- Characterizing approval voting
- Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof
- Strategy stability and sincerity in approval voting
- Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
- Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
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