Essential aggregation procedures on restricted domains of preferences
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Publication:1056651
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(83)90092-3zbMath0523.90010OpenAlexW2093046526WikidataQ56114305 ScholiaQ56114305MaRDI QIDQ1056651
Eitan Muller, Douglas H. Blair
Publication date: 1983
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90092-3
neutralityrestricted domainsarrow social welfare functionsessential aggregation proceduresnondictatorial proceduresnonmanipulable voting procedures
Related Items
Approval voting on dichotomous preferences, Stable preference aggregation with infinite population, On strategy-proof social choice under categorization, Circular domains, Social Choice Theory, Bounded response and the equivalence of nonmanipulability and independence of irrelevant alternatives, A note on nondictatorial conditions for choice mechanisms
Cites Work
- Characterization of the private alternatives domains admitting Arrow social welfare functions
- Effective nondictatorial domains
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
- A Note on the General Possibility Theorem of the Social Welfare Function
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- A Characterization of Societies with Consistent Majority Decision
- On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule
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