A note on nondictatorial conditions for choice mechanisms
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It is demonstrated that weakening the strong nondictatorship requirement stated by \textit{A. Gibbard} [Econometrica 41, 587-601 (1973; Zbl 0325.90081)] and by \textit{M. A. Satterthwaite} [J. Econ. Theory 10, 187-217 (1975; Zbl 0315.90088)] enables the construction of strategy-proof choice mechanisms by shifting the difficulties from the phase of choice mechanism construction to the phase of agenda formation.
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Cites work
- Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
- Characterization of the private alternatives domains admitting Arrow social welfare functions
- Effective nondictatorial domains
- Essential aggregation procedures on restricted domains of preferences
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Restricted domains, Arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives
- Social choice and individual values
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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