Weak strategy proofness: The case of nonbinary social choice functions
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835696 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3635767 (Why is no real title available?)
- Coalitional manipulation and the Pareto rule
- Counter-threats and Strategic Manipulation under Voting Schemes
- Intransitive social indifference and the Arrow dilemma
- Limited resoluteness and strategic voting: The case of linear sincere preference orderings
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Manipulation of nonimposed, nonoligarchic, nonbinary group decision rules
- Manipulation of social decision functions
- Monotonicity, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Strategy- Proofness of Social Decision Functions
- On a class of strictly nonmanipulable collective choice rules
- On the frontier between possibility and impossibility theorems in social choice
- Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions
- Social choice and individual values
- Strategic voting under minimally binary group decision functions
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
- Threats, Counter-Threats, and Strategic Voting
- Threats, counter-threats and strategic manipulation for non-binary group decision rules
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