Intransitive social indifference and the Arrow dilemma
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(30)- On the structure of fuzzy social welfare functions
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- Rationality and aggregation of preferences in an ordinally fuzzy framework
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- Social evaluation functionals with an arbitrary set of alternatives
- Choice procedures and power structure in social decisions
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- Aggregation of evaluations without unanimity
- The Arrow paradox with fuzzy preferences
- Sophisticated preference aggregation
- Can equity be purchased at the expense of efficiency? An axiomatic inquiry
- Aggregation of binary evaluations with abstentions
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