A foundation for Pareto optimality

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.02.005MaRDI QIDQ2178580zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Conal Duddy, Ashley Piggins

Publication date 11 May 2020

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.005

zbMATH Keywords

\(P\)-independence\(P\)-oligarchyfixed agendaoligarchyPareto optimal social choice correspondence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• A foundation for Pareto aggregation
• Characterization of social choice sets in terms of individuals' maximal sets: the fixed agenda framework
• Fixed agenda social choice theory: Correspondence and impossibility theorems for social choice correspondences and social decision functions
• Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
• Hierarchies of power in non-binary social choice
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
• Independent social choice correspondences are dictatorial
• Intransitive social indifference and the Arrow dilemma
• Introduction to the theory of voting
• Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions
• Sen's proofs of the Arrow and Gibbard theorems
• Social choice and individual values
• Some further results on nonbinary social choice
• Voting and group decision functions

Cited in

(14)

• A Pareto optimal characterization of Rawls' social choice mechanism
• Social structure, economic performance and Pareto optimality
• A foundation for Pareto aggregation
• Relaxing Pareto optimality in economic environments
• Characterization of the Pareto social choice correspondence
• Revealed desirability: a novel instrument for social welfare
• Characterization of social choice sets in terms of individuals' maximal sets: the fixed agenda framework
• Collective choice rules with social maximality
• Pareto utility
• A dynamic foundation of the Rawlsian maxmin criterion
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1975103 (Why is no real title available?)
• THE PARETO PRINCIPLE OF OPTIMAL INEQUALITY*
• A note on the McKelvey uncovered set and Pareto optimality
• ``Near weighted utilitarian characterizations of Pareto optima

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