A foundation for Pareto optimality

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.02.005zbMATH Open1437.91183OpenAlexW3009542689MaRDI QIDQ2178580FDOQ2178580

Authors: Conal Duddy, Ashley Piggins 

Publication date: 11 May 2020

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.005

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zbMATH Keywords

oligarchyfixed agenda\(P\)-independence\(P\)-oligarchyPareto optimal social choice correspondence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Social choice and individual values
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
• Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions
• Intransitive social indifference and the Arrow dilemma
• Voting and group decision functions
• Independent social choice correspondences are dictatorial
• A foundation for Pareto aggregation
• Some further results on nonbinary social choice
• Fixed agenda social choice theory: Correspondence and impossibility theorems for social choice correspondences and social decision functions
• Characterization of social choice sets in terms of individuals' maximal sets: the fixed agenda framework
• Hierarchies of power in non-binary social choice
• Introduction to the theory of voting
• Sen's proofs of the Arrow and Gibbard theorems

Cited In (11)

• A Pareto optimal characterization of Rawls' social choice mechanism
• THE PARETO PRINCIPLE OF OPTIMAL INEQUALITY*
• Collective choice rules with social maximality
• Characterization of the Pareto social choice correspondence
• A note on the McKelvey uncovered set and Pareto optimality
• Characterization of social choice sets in terms of individuals' maximal sets: the fixed agenda framework
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Pareto utility
• A dynamic foundation of the Rawlsian maxmin criterion
• ``Near weighted utilitarian characterizations of Pareto optima
• Revealed desirability: a novel instrument for social welfare

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