Hierarchies of power in non-binary social choice
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Publication:859603
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.03.007zbMath1153.91404OpenAlexW2069755374MaRDI QIDQ859603
M. Carmen Sánchez, Josep E. Peris
Publication date: 16 January 2007
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.03.007
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Cites Work
- Hierarchical voting
- Fixed agenda social choice theory: Correspondence and impossibility theorems for social choice correspondences and social decision functions
- Characterization of social choice sets in terms of individuals' maximal sets: the fixed agenda framework
- Acyclic Collective Choice Rules
- Axioms for Lexicographic Preferences
- Social Decision Functions and the Veto