Collective choice rules with social maximality
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Publication:2668991
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102615zbMath1483.91075OpenAlexW4200418281MaRDI QIDQ2668991
Publication date: 9 March 2022
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102615
Cites Work
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