Acyclic Collective Choice Rules
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Publication:3942698
DOI10.2307/1912770zbMath0483.90009OpenAlexW2061426035MaRDI QIDQ3942698
Robert A. Pollak, Douglas H. Blair
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912770
independenceveto playerquasi-transitivityunrestricted domainweak Pareto principleirrelevant alternativesacyclic rulesArrow axiomsaxiomatic characterization of Pareto extension rulecharacterization of collective choice rules
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