Limits of acyclic voting
From MaRDI portal
Publication:281385
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.02.004zbMATH Open1369.91054OpenAlexW2289926752MaRDI QIDQ281385FDOQ281385
Authors: John Duggan 
Publication date: 11 May 2016
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.02.004
Recommendations
Cites Work
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- Impossibility theorems without collective rationality
- Acyclicity and the dispersion of the veto power
- Acyclic Collective Choice Rules
- k-Monotone Social Decision Functions and the Veto
- General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
- Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures
Cited In (11)
- Acyclicity, anonymity, and prefilters
- Ultimate fate of constrained voters
- Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction
- A procedural condition necessary and sufficient for cyclic social preference
- Strong and weak acyclicity in iterative voting
- Majority rule for profiles of arbitrary length, with an emphasis on the consistency axiom
- Limited Rights as Partial Veto and Sen’s Impossibility Theorem
- From social welfare ordering to acyclic aggregation of preferences
- An algebraic approach to revealed preference
- Acyclic social choice from finite sets
- Acyclic choice and group veto
This page was built for publication: Limits of acyclic voting
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q281385)
