Impossibility theorems without collective rationality
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Publication:1239677
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(76)90047-8zbMATH Open0361.90005OpenAlexW2014216316MaRDI QIDQ1239677FDOQ1239677
Authors: Douglas H. Blair, Georges Bordes, Jerry S. Kelly, Kotaro Suzumura 
Publication date: 1976
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(76)90047-8
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Cited In (50)
- Smallest quasi-transitive extensions
- New problems in the general choice theory
- Social Choice Theory
- Rational budgeters in the theory of social choice
- No-envy, efficiency, and collective rationality
- Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis
- On justifiable choice functions over opportunity sets
- Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness
- Independence of irrelevant alternatives in the theory of voting
- Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules
- Limits of acyclic voting
- Quasi-transitive and Suzumura consistent relations
- On Pareto-efficiency and the no-envy concept of equity
- On the frontier between possibility and impossibility theorems in social choice
- Veto theorems with expansion consistency conditions and without the weak Pareto principle
- Collective rationality and dictatorship: The scope of the Arrow theorem
- Choice functions and weak Nash axioms
- Combinatorial versus decision-theoretic components of impossibility theorems
- Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited
- Indifference and incompleteness distinguished by rational trade
- A rote on impossibility theorems and seniority rules
- Arrovian theorems with private alternatives domains and selfish individuals
- A characterization of prudent choices
- Lexicographic compositions of multiple criteria for decision making
- Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems
- Social choice rules and real-valued representations
- Weak independence and the Pareto principle
- Extended anonymity and Paretian relations on infinite utility streams
- Sequential path independence and social choice
- Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability
- Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions
- Arrow's decisive coalitions
- The Sertel and van der Bellen problems
- Weakly implementable social choice rules
- Quasitransitive rationalization and the superset property
- Rationality, path independence, and the power structure
- Rights Revisited, and Limited
- On the routewise application of choice
- A new characterization of the path independent choice functions
- Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence
- On the possibility of reasonable consistent majoritarian choice: Some positive results
- The impossibility of a weakly path independent Paretian liberal
- Characterization of a \(k\)-th best element rationalizable choice function with full domain
- The possibility of generalized social choice functions and Nash's independence of irrelevant alternatives
- Path independence in serial-parallel data processing
- Aggregation of preferences: The fuzzy case
- Sequential rationalization of multivalued choice
- Some impossibility results with domain restrictions
- Continuous-valued social choice
- Generic impossibility of Arrow's impossibility theorem
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