Impossibility theorems without collective rationality
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Publication:1239677
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(76)90047-8zbMath0361.90005OpenAlexW2014216316MaRDI QIDQ1239677
Kotaro Suzumura, Georges Bordes, Douglas H. Blair, Jerry S. Kelly
Publication date: 1976
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(76)90047-8
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