Impossibility theorems without collective rationality
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3436873 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
- Choice Functions and Revealed Preference
- Choice structures and preference relations
- Ethics, social choice theory and the theory of economic policy†
- General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
- Intransitive social indifference and the Arrow dilemma
- Ordinal Preference and Rational Choice
- Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
- Path-Independent Social Choice Functions: A Further Result
- Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions
- Rational Choice and Revealed Preference
- Rational Selection of Decision Functions
- Revealed Preference Theory
- Social choice and individual values
Cited in
(50)- Continuous-valued social choice
- New problems in the general choice theory
- Generic impossibility of Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Rational budgeters in the theory of social choice
- Social Choice Theory
- Smallest quasi-transitive extensions
- No-envy, efficiency, and collective rationality
- Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis
- On justifiable choice functions over opportunity sets
- Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness
- Independence of irrelevant alternatives in the theory of voting
- Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules
- Limits of acyclic voting
- Quasi-transitive and Suzumura consistent relations
- On Pareto-efficiency and the no-envy concept of equity
- On the frontier between possibility and impossibility theorems in social choice
- Veto theorems with expansion consistency conditions and without the weak Pareto principle
- Collective rationality and dictatorship: The scope of the Arrow theorem
- Choice functions and weak Nash axioms
- Combinatorial versus decision-theoretic components of impossibility theorems
- Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited
- Indifference and incompleteness distinguished by rational trade
- A rote on impossibility theorems and seniority rules
- Arrovian theorems with private alternatives domains and selfish individuals
- A characterization of prudent choices
- Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems
- Lexicographic compositions of multiple criteria for decision making
- Social choice rules and real-valued representations
- Weak independence and the Pareto principle
- Extended anonymity and Paretian relations on infinite utility streams
- Rights revisited, and limited
- Sequential path independence and social choice
- Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability
- Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions
- Arrow's decisive coalitions
- The Sertel and van der Bellen problems
- Weakly implementable social choice rules
- Quasitransitive rationalization and the superset property
- Rationality, path independence, and the power structure
- On the routewise application of choice
- On the possibility of reasonable consistent majoritarian choice: Some positive results
- Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence
- A new characterization of the path independent choice functions
- The impossibility of a weakly path independent Paretian liberal
- Characterization of a \(k\)-th best element rationalizable choice function with full domain
- Path independence in serial-parallel data processing
- Aggregation of preferences: The fuzzy case
- The possibility of generalized social choice functions and Nash's independence of irrelevant alternatives
- Some impossibility results with domain restrictions
- Sequential rationalization of multivalued choice
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