Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules
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Publication:1113779
DOI10.1007/BF00435496zbMath0661.90004OpenAlexW2021965161MaRDI QIDQ1113779
G. A. Bordes, Jeffrey S. Banks
Publication date: 1988
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00435496
choice functionsconsistency conditionsstationary pointscomplete strict majority relationequilibrium outcomessequential choice rules
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