Extending tournament solutions

DOI10.1007/s00355-018-1112-xzbMath1417.91192OpenAlexW2184922637MaRDI QIDQ1616754

Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Paul Harrenstein

Publication date: 7 November 2018

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-1112-x

zbMATH Keywords

tournamentconservative extensionsocial choice functionsmajoritarian functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of graph theory (05C90) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

The flow network method ⋮ In the beginning there were \(n\) agents: founding and amending a constitution ⋮ Margin of victory for tournament solutions

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