The bipartisan set of a tournament game
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Publication:1207833
DOI10.1006/game.1993.1010zbMath0770.90080OpenAlexW2020516048MaRDI QIDQ1207833
Jean-François Laslier, Gilbert Laffond, Michel Le Breton
Publication date: 16 May 1993
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1010
tournamentBipartisan Setcomplete asymmetric binary relationtwo-player symmetric zero-sum gameunique mixed-strategy equilibrium
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