Equilibrium existence for zero-sum games and spatial models of elections
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2384431
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.004zbMath1155.91303MaRDI QIDQ2384431
Publication date: 21 September 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.004
91A10: Noncooperative games
91A05: 2-person games
91B12: Voting theory
91B72: Spatial models in economics
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