Distributive politics and electoral competition
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1599829
DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2775zbMath1031.91024WikidataQ60680561 ScholiaQ60680561MaRDI QIDQ1599829
Jean-François Laslier, Nathalie Picard
Publication date: 27 February 2004
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2775
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