Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments
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Publication:2386312
DOI10.1007/s003550050141zbMath1066.91541OpenAlexW1981535145MaRDI QIDQ2386312
Publication date: 22 August 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-1997-05.pdf
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