Uncovered sets
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Publication:2453411
DOI10.1007/s00355-012-0696-9zbMath1288.91066OpenAlexW3192060583MaRDI QIDQ2453411
Publication date: 6 June 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0696-9
Related Items (19)
Extending tournament solutions ⋮ Generalized medians and a political center ⋮ A note on extended stable sets ⋮ The Banks set in infinite spaces ⋮ Modeling optimal social choice: matrix-vector representation of various solution concepts based on majority rule ⋮ Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory ⋮ A unified view of the existence of maximals ⋮ Dynamic stable set as a tournament solution ⋮ Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness ⋮ Computing minimal extending sets by relation-algebraic modeling and development ⋮ Asymmetric majority pillage games ⋮ Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness ⋮ Alternate definitions of the uncovered set and their implications ⋮ General conditions for the existence of maximal elements via the uncovered set ⋮ A topological characterization of the non-emptiness of the banks set and the uncovered set ⋮ The solution of generalized stable sets and its refinement ⋮ A note on the McKelvey uncovered set and Pareto optimality ⋮ Topological connectedness and behavioral assumptions on preferences: a two-way relationship ⋮ King-chicken choice correspondences
Cites Work
- A systematic approach to the construction of non-empty choice sets
- On the possibility of reasonable consistent majoritarian choice: Some positive results
- Minimal stable sets in tournaments
- The Banks set in infinite spaces
- Computing the minimal covering set
- Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
- Choosing from a tournament
- The bipartisan set of a tournament game
- A general extension theorem for binary relations
- Uncovering some subtleties of the uncovered set: Social choice theory and distributive politics
- Bounds for mixed strategy equilibria and the spatial model of elections
- Equilibrium existence for zero-sum games and spatial models of elections
- Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments
- Comparison functions and choice correspondences
- Mixed refinements of Shapley's saddles and weak tournaments
- Alternate definitions of the uncovered set and their implications
- Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model
- Gillies and Miller's Subrelations of a Relation over an Infinite Set of Alternatives: General Results and Applications to Voting Games
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
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