A systematic approach to the construction of non-empty choice sets
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Publication:535405
DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0176-1zbMath1211.91106MaRDI QIDQ535405
Publication date: 11 May 2011
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0176-1
91B14: Social choice
Related Items
Variable preference relations: existence of maximal elements, The Condorcet set: majority voting over interconnected propositions, On the construction of non-empty choice sets, Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction, On stable solutions to the ordinal social choice problem, Preference-based choice functions: a generalized approach, Making choices with a binary relation: relative choice axioms and transitive closures, A topological characterization of the non-emptiness of the banks set and the uncovered set, Dominating, weakly stable, and uncovered sets: properties and generalizations, Modeling optimal social choice: matrix-vector representation of various solution concepts based on majority rule, Common characterizations of the untrapped set and the top cycle, Uncovered sets
Cites Work
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- Choosing from a tournament
- On the existence of maximal elements
- A general extension theorem for binary relations
- Bounds for mixed strategy equilibria and the spatial model of elections
- Acyclic social choice from finite sets
- From Arrow to cycles, instability, and chaos by untying alternatives
- Mixed refinements of Shapley's saddles and weak tournaments
- Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
