A systematic approach to the construction of non-empty choice sets
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:535405)
Recommendations
Cites work
- A general extension theorem for binary relations
- Acyclic social choice from finite sets
- Bounds for mixed strategy equilibria and the spatial model of elections
- Choosing from a tournament
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- From Arrow to cycles, instability, and chaos by untying alternatives
- General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
- Mixed refinements of Shapley's saddles and weak tournaments
- On the existence of maximal elements
- Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model
- Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
Cited in
(14)- A topological characterization of the non-emptiness of the banks set and the uncovered set
- The Condorcet set: majority voting over interconnected propositions
- Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction
- On stable solutions to the ordinal social choice problem
- Uncovered sets
- On the construction of non-empty choice sets
- Preference-based choice functions: a generalized approach
- A topological characterization of the existence of non-empty choice sets
- Making choices with a binary relation: relative choice axioms and transitive closures
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3848913 (Why is no real title available?)
- Dominating, weakly stable, and uncovered sets: properties and generalizations
- Modeling optimal social choice: matrix-vector representation of various solution concepts based on majority rule
- Common characterizations of the untrapped set and the top cycle
- Variable preference relations: existence of maximal elements
This page was built for publication: A systematic approach to the construction of non-empty choice sets
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q535405)
