Choosing from a tournament
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Cites work
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- The Copeland choice function. An axiomatic characterization
Cited in
(96)- Uncovered set choice rules
- Choosing from a large tournament
- Discrepancies in the outcomes resulting from different voting schemes
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- Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules
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