Approximating optimal social choice under metric preferences
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Publication:668776
DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2018.07.006zbMATH Open1482.91082OpenAlexW2886307781WikidataQ129370384 ScholiaQ129370384MaRDI QIDQ668776FDOQ668776
Authors: Elliot Anshelevich, Onkar Bhardwaj, Edith Elkind, John Postl, Piotr Skowron 
Publication date: 19 March 2019
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2018.07.006
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Cites Work
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Cited In (30)
- Estimation of social preferences in generalized dictator games
- The distortion of distributed metric social choice
- The distortion of distributed metric social choice
- Randomized social choice functions under metric preferences
- Demystifying the `metric approach to social compromise with the unanimity criterion'
- Peeking behind the ordinal curtain: improving distortion via cardinal queries
- New metric procedure of multi-decisions makers choice
- More effort towards multiagent knapsack
- Utilitarian welfare and representation guarantees of approval-based multiwinner rules
- Don’t Roll the Dice, Ask Twice: The Two-Query Distortion of Matching Problems and Beyond
- Revisiting the distortion of distributed voting
- Approximate mechanism design for distributed facility location
- Metric-distortion bounds under limited information
- Socially desirable approximations for dodgson’s voting rule
- Truthful ownership transfer with expert advice
- Aggregation over metric spaces: proposing and voting in elections, budgeting, and legislation
- Voting almost maximizes social welfare despite limited communication
- Tight distortion bounds for distributed metric voting on a line
- Beyond the worst-case analysis of random priority: smoothed and average-case approximation ratios in mechanism design
- The distortion of distributed voting
- Awareness of voter passion greatly improves the distortion of metric social choice
- Breaking the metric voting distortion barrier
- Optimal social choice functions: a utilitarian view
- Algorithms, approximation, and empirical studies in behavioral and computational social choice -- preface
- Ordinal approximation for social choice, matching, and facility location problems given candidate positions
- On ordered weighted averaging social optima
- Representative committees of peers
- Truthful facility assignment with resource augmentation: an exact analysis of serial dictatorship
- Facility location games with optional preference
- The distortion of distributed voting
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