Welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences
DOI10.1145/2554797.2554810zbMath1366.91091arXiv1312.1831OpenAlexW2097613630MaRDI QIDQ2988871
Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Chaitanya Swamy
Publication date: 19 May 2017
Published in: Proceedings of the 5th conference on Innovations in theoretical computer science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1312.1831
linear programmingmatroidsordinal preferencesmechanism designalgorithmic game theorycomputational social choice theorysocial welfare and rank approximationtruthfulness for randomized mechanisms
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Randomized algorithms (68W20) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items (4)
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