On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
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Publication:4612470
Recommendations
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Cites work
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- A cardinal approach to straightforward probabilistic mechanisms
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- Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
- Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism: Figure 1
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- Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
- Lotteries in student assignment: an equivalence result
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Mechanism design with maxmin agents: theory and an application to bilateral trade
- Mixture Symmetry and Quadratic Utility
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains
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- Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules
- Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences
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- Random dictatorship domains
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- School Choice with Consent*
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- The Limits of ex post Implementation
- The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium
- When are local incentive constraints sufficient?
Cited in
(15)- Market Design
- Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies
- Inferring quantitative preferences: beyond logical deduction
- A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6453198 (Why is no real title available?)
- Peeking behind the ordinal curtain: improving distortion via cardinal queries
- A mechanistic model for partial preferences.
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3871089 (Why is no real title available?)
- Welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences
- Ordinal Preference Models Based on S-Integrals and Their Verification
- Random assignments and outside options
- Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
- Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms
- Playing a game or making a decision? Methodological issues in the measurement of distributional preferences
- The ordinal consistency of an incomplete reciprocal preference relation
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