On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
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Publication:4612470
DOI10.3982/TE2774zbMath1419.91236OpenAlexW2898563822WikidataQ129046390 ScholiaQ129046390MaRDI QIDQ4612470
Publication date: 31 January 2019
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te2774
Related Items
Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms, A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation, Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies, Market Design, Random assignments and outside options
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