Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.01.007zbMath1239.91050OpenAlexW2079260767MaRDI QIDQ423772

Peter Troyan

Publication date: 4 June 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.01.007

zbMATH Keywords

deferred acceptanceschool choiceBoston mechanismex-ante welfareGale-Shapleystrategyproof

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (21)

Enrollment manipulations in school choice ⋮ The object allocation problem with random priorities ⋮ Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation ⋮ Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms ⋮ Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study ⋮ Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak ⋮ Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification ⋮ Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information ⋮ CATCHMENT AREAS, STRATIFICATION, AND ACCESS TO BETTER SCHOOLS ⋮ Aiding applicants: leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism ⋮ A modification aimed at reducing the manipulability and inefficiency of the Boston school choice mechanism ⋮ Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China's college admissions ⋮ On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences ⋮ High school admission reform in China: a welfare analysis ⋮ Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies ⋮ Sticky matching in school choice ⋮ Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation ⋮ Level-k reasoning in school choice ⋮ Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab ⋮ College assignment problems under constrained choice, private preferences, and risk aversion ⋮ Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms
• Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

This page was built for publication: Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare