Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
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Recommendations
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- Axioms for deferred acceptance
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
Cited in
(27)- Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation
- Improving schools through school choice: an experimental study of deferred acceptance
- Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism
- High school admission reform in China: a welfare analysis
- Enrollment manipulations in school choice
- Aiding applicants: leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism
- Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information
- Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies
- Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice
- Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment
- Level-k reasoning in school choice
- A modification aimed at reducing the manipulability and inefficiency of the Boston school choice mechanism
- Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab
- The object allocation problem with random priorities
- Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
- Asymptotic Welfare Performance of Boston Assignment Algorithms
- Sticky matching in school choice
- Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study
- Estimating the welfare gains from public schools in rural India
- Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak
- Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
- College assignment problems under constrained choice, private preferences, and risk aversion
- On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
- Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation
- Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China's college admissions
- CATCHMENT AREAS, STRATIFICATION, AND ACCESS TO BETTER SCHOOLS
- Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission
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