Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.12.032zbMATH Open1242.91062OpenAlexW2125873375MaRDI QIDQ433162FDOQ433162

Authors: Jose Apesteguia, Miguel A. Ballester 

Publication date: 13 July 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/19875

Recommendations

• Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism
• Constrained school choice
• School Choice with Consent^*
• Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
• The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach

zbMATH Keywords

welfarenaive playersschool choiceveil of ignorance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

• On the justice of decision rules

Cited In (4)

• Cognitive ability and games of school choice
• Level-k reasoning in school choice
• Manipulability in school choice
• Satisficing and maximizing consumers in a monopolistic screening model

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