School Choice with Consent*
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3162725
DOI10.1162/qjec.2010.125.3.1297zbMath1197.91153OpenAlexW2065714551MaRDI QIDQ3162725
Publication date: 21 October 2010
Published in: Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2010.125.3.1297
Related Items (73)
When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action? ⋮ Decentralized college admissions under single application ⋮ Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets ⋮ Responsive affirmative action in school choice ⋮ Towards a fair distribution mechanism for asylum ⋮ Two-sided matching with indifferences ⋮ Matching through institutions ⋮ An alternative characterization of top trading cycles ⋮ Incompatibility between stability and consistency ⋮ What you don't know can help you in school assignment ⋮ Essentially stable matchings ⋮ Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings ⋮ The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints ⋮ The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism ⋮ Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods ⋮ Strategy-proof stochastic assignment ⋮ When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? ⋮ New axioms for top trading cycles ⋮ Distance on matchings: An axiomatic approach ⋮ School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds ⋮ Strategy-proof allocation with outside option ⋮ CATCHMENT AREAS, STRATIFICATION, AND ACCESS TO BETTER SCHOOLS ⋮ Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences ⋮ School choice with transferable student characteristics ⋮ Stability of an allocation of objects ⋮ A modification aimed at reducing the manipulability and inefficiency of the Boston school choice mechanism ⋮ Epsilon-stability in school choice ⋮ The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice ⋮ Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems ⋮ Reallocation with priorities ⋮ Preferences and the price of stability in matching markets ⋮ Finding all stable matchings with couples ⋮ Fair student placement ⋮ On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences ⋮ What price stability? Social welfare in matching markets ⋮ The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach ⋮ A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea ⋮ A marriage matching mechanism menagerie ⋮ The extended serial correspondence on a rich preference domain ⋮ On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm ⋮ Manipulability in school choice ⋮ Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets ⋮ Market Design ⋮ Two simple variations of top trading cycles ⋮ A necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness consistency in the stable marriage matching problem ⋮ On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts ⋮ Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution ⋮ Sticky matching in school choice ⋮ On the operation of multiple matching markets ⋮ Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule ⋮ Matching with indifferences: a comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation ⋮ School choice with priority-based affirmative action: a responsive solution ⋮ School choice with vouchers ⋮ Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas ⋮ On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems ⋮ Efficient assignment respecting priorities ⋮ Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility ⋮ Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: improving student welfare in Chicago ⋮ Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice ⋮ Obvious manipulations ⋮ Making just school assignments ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm ⋮ Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities ⋮ School choice with hybrid schedules ⋮ Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice ⋮ Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab ⋮ Gradual college admission ⋮ On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice ⋮ Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications ⋮ Influence in private-goods allocation ⋮ Corrigendum to: ``Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution ⋮ Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure ⋮ Tie-breaking and efficiency in the laboratory school choice
This page was built for publication: School Choice with Consent*
