School Choice with Consent*
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Publication:3162725
DOI10.1162/qjec.2010.125.3.1297zbMath1197.91153MaRDI QIDQ3162725
Publication date: 21 October 2010
Published in: Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2010.125.3.1297
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