The extended serial correspondence on a rich preference domain
DOI10.1007/S00182-013-0388-4zbMATH Open1307.91104OpenAlexW1981274624MaRDI QIDQ2453497FDOQ2453497
Authors: Eun Jeong Heo 
Publication date: 6 June 2014
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0388-4
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sd-efficiencysd no-envyextended serial correspondencerich support on a partitionsingle-peaked preference profiles with rich support on a partition
Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Discrete location and assignment (90B80)
Cites Work
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- A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
- School Choice with Consent*
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule
- On characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism involving incentive and invariance properties
- Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
- A characterization of the extended serial correspondence
- Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences
Cited In (7)
- A new ex-ante efficiency criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: a generalization of the serial rule and its characterization
- A characterization of the extended serial correspondence
- Constrained random matching
- When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free?
- Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation
- Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule
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