A new ex-ante efficiency criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.01.011MaRDI QIDQ1753688zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Battal Doğan, Serhat Doğan, Kemal Yıldız

Publication date 29 May 2018

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/11693/48988

zbMATH Keywords

fairnessprobabilistic serial mechanismprobabilistic assignmentex-ante efficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Welfare economics (91B15)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078983 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3095897 (Why is no real title available?)
• A constructive proof of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
• A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
• Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
• Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems
• Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem
• The extended serial correspondence on a rich preference domain
• Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
• When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free?

Cited in

(14)

• On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals
• A simple characterization of assignment mechanisms on set constraints
• Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems
• A characterization of the extended serial correspondence
• Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information
• Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
• Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?
• A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
• Ex-ante efficiency in assignments with seniority rights
• Extended random assignment mechanisms on a family of good sets
• Efficient rules for probabilistic assignment
• Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism
• Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems
• When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free?

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