A new ex-ante efficiency criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078983 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3095897 (Why is no real title available?)
- A constructive proof of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
- A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
- Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
- Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems
- Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem
- The extended serial correspondence on a rich preference domain
- Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
- When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free?
Cited in
(14)- Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems
- Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems
- Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism
- A simple characterization of assignment mechanisms on set constraints
- Extended random assignment mechanisms on a family of good sets
- Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
- A characterization of the extended serial correspondence
- A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
- Ex-ante efficiency in assignments with seniority rights
- Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?
- Efficient rules for probabilistic assignment
- When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free?
- On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals
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