Efficient rules for probabilistic assignment
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Publication:2338661
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.07.006zbMath1427.91180OpenAlexW2965231657MaRDI QIDQ2338661
Publication date: 21 November 2019
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.07.006
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
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