An efficiency theorem for incompletely known preferences

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.03.015MaRDI QIDQ617691zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gabriel Carroll

Publication date 13 January 2011

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.03.015

zbMATH Keywords

dominanceordinal efficiency welfare theoremPareto efficiencyunknown preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Welfare economics (91B15) Utility theory (91B16)

Review text

This papers establishes, for finite sets of alternatives and finite sets of decision makers with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, conditions on the set of utilities which are necessary and sufficient for the equivalence between a lottery being Pareto efficient for some utility function and the absence of other lottery that is guaranteed to Pareto dominate it. This result includes the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem as a special case.

Recommendations

• Pareto optima and equilibria when preferences are incompletely known
• Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions
• Preference aggregation with incomplete information
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Cites work

• A constructive proof of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• Constrained school choice
• Expected utility theory without the completeness axiom.
• Lectures on Polytopes
• Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
• Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem
• Utility Theory without the Completeness Axiom
• Utility Theory without the Completeness Axiom: A Correction
• WELFARE ECONOMICS AND EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY

Cited in

(17)

• An impossibility theorem with von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences
• Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources
• Efficient rules for probabilistic assignment
• Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference
• A strict expected multi-utility theorem
• Pareto optima and equilibria when preferences are incompletely known
• Multicriteria efficiency with arbitrary finite sets and cyclic preferences
• Scalarization methods and expected multi-utility representations
• An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences
• On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
• Efficiency under a combination of ordinal and cardinal information on preferences
• Preferences and decisions under incomplete knowledge. Dedicated to Marc Roubens on the occasion of his 60th anniversary
• Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems
• Incomplete preferences or incomplete information? On rationalizability in games with private values
• A general impossibility theorem on Pareto efficiency and Bayesian incentive compatibility
• Empirical welfare economics
• Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions

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